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Abstract 
 
China’s multi-faceted endeavor to expand its influence in Africa has attracted worldwide 
scholarly and media attention. This paper examines the different moments of China’s soft 
power endeavor from projection through its state media to representation and lived-
experiences in South Africa and Zimbabwe, two African countries which receive a high 
level of attention in China’s policymaking. Through such inter-disciplinary 
methodologies as content analysis, on-line questionnaire and in-depth interviews in China, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, the authors find that China’s state-engineered soft power 
initiatives have resulted in partial success in the two countries. It indicates that China 
faces many challenges in fully accomplishing its intended goal. The paper throws light on 
China’s political impact in Africa as China reshapes the continent economically. 
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China’s presence in Africa dwarfs many other powers.2 Observers have often cited the 
rising trade and investment figures to show ‘the extent, the intensity, the speed, and the 
impact of China’s relations in Africa’3 -- China is now Africa’s largest trading partner, 
with the bilateral trade volume surging from $10 billion in 2000 to $200 billion in 2012. 
Indeed with limited investment in Africa before the 2000s, China’s cumulative 
investment in Africa reached $21 billion in 2012, with over 2,000 Chinese companies 
operating across the continent.4 Africa has thus become China’s ‘second largest overseas 
labor and project contracting market and fourth largest destination for outward 
investment’.5 The scale of China’s presence in Africa is made visible by the increasing 
number of bridges, dams, roads, railroads, stadiums, ports, oil infrastructure, and radio 
and TV stations by its state-run firms. Ian Taylor calls this rise of China’s presence in 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgement 
2 David Shambaugh, ‘Coping with a conflicted China’, The Washington Quarterly 34(1), (Winter 2011), p. 
22. 
3 David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p. ix. 
4 Xiangming Chen and Garth Myers, ‘China and Africa: the crucial urban connection’, The European 
Financial Review, (28 December 2013), available at: http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=557.   
5 Wenping He, ‘More soft power needed in Africa’, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, (28 February 
2012), available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/xsjl/xzzs/t909111.htm (accessed 18 May 2014).   
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Africa ‘arguably the most important development for the continent since the end of the 
Cold War’.6 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first high profile overseas trip to Africa in 
March 2013 confirmed China’s continuing engagement by committing further financial 
assistance.7   
    China’s engagement in Africa is not just economic. What has also attracted scholarly 
and media attention worldwide is China’s great endeavor to gain influence in Africa, just 
as Xinhua Executive Deputy Editor-in-Chief Zhou Qisheng said: ‘we cannot just rely on 
economic power alone!’8 In addition to such efforts as setting up Confucius Institutes and 
providing cultural exchange programs, China has greatly increased the momentum of 
establishing its media presence in Africa as important instruments of soft power, 9 
causing some to believe that China has already displaced European, American and 
Japanese diplomatic and capitalistic soft power in many sub-Saharan African countries,10 
and others to claim that ‘China aims to dominate the African media sector with the 
introduction of a radio broadcaster, news agency, TV station and newspaper to the 
African market’.11  
Indeed, Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (CCTV), China Radio 
International (CRI) and China Daily -- the “Big Four” official media outlets as China’s 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi called them12 -- have all increased their 
presence and expanded their reach as important instruments of soft power in Africa. 
Xinhua, the world’s largest news agency with 13 bureaus in English, nine in French and 
two in Portuguese in Africa, has developed the most outlets of any Chinese or western 
news agency on the continent. In 2006, its Africa Regional Bureau in Nairobi took over 
the production and distribution of French language reports from the Paris Bureau. Two 
years later, Xinhua launched its China African News Service. CNC World, the English-
                                                 
6 Ian Taylor, ‘China’s challenges: Africa’, The Diplomat (15 February 2013), available at: 
http://www.thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/africa/. 
7 ‘China set to expand influence in Africa on back of Xi Jinping's trip’, The Economic Times (31 March 
2013), available at: http://www.articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-
31/news/38163340_1_african-leaders-south-africa-brics (accessed 2 March 2014).   
8 Quoted in David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p.230. 
9 For soft power see Joseph Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2004); Joseph Nye, ‘Think again: soft power’, Foreign Policy 1, (23 February 2006), 
available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power (accessed 2 
October 2014); Joseph Nye, Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2012); for China’s embrace of 
soft power see Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, ‘The conception of soft power  
and its policy implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 
17(56), (August 2008), pp.425–447; for China’s international communications as instruments of soft power 
see Xiaoling Zhang’China’s international broadcasting: the case of CCTV international’,in J. Wang, ed, 
Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp.57 – 71. 
10 Chuka Enuka, ‘The forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC): a framework for China’s re- 
engagement with Africa in the 21st century’, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 30(2),(2010), pp. 209-218. 
11 Nadina Schwarzbeck, ‘China expands media reach in Africa’, Deutsche Welle, (07 January 2013), 
available at: http://www.dw.de/china-expands-media-reach-in-africa/a-16503491 (accessed 26 October 
2014). 
12 Jiechi Yang, ‘A changing China in a changing world’, (paper presented at the Munich Security 
Conference, Germany, 5 February, 2010), available at: 
http://www.maximsnews.com/news20100212ChinaYangJiechiMunich11002120101.htm (accessed 18 
February 2012).  
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language TV channel of Xinhua, reached cable television audiences in Africa in 2011.13 
Its launch of mobile news in sub-Saharan Africa in April 2011 also enabled about 17 
million Kenyan mobile subscribers to receive Xinhua’s latest news.14  China has also 
stepped up its penetration of African airwaves. On 26 February 2006, CRI launched its 
first overseas station with its FM channels in three East African cities and its AM channel 
covering all of Kenya. China’s leading English-language state newspaper, China Daily, 
launched its Africa Weekly edition in late 2012. It is published in Nairobi and distributed 
on Kenya Airways flights and other venues. What York considers ‘the centerpiece of 
China’s media empire’,15 the new CCTV hub in Nairobi and its flagship show, Africa 
Live, were launched in January 2012. Every day CCTV Africa provides an hour-long 
program for the global CCTV News. CCTV’s mobile TV application I Love Africa was 
also launched in January 2012.  
    To ensure readership and audience, these media organizations purchase space in 
African newspapers and increase the amount of news-sharing. Shinn and Eisenman 
reported that Xinhua has bought space in eight Zimbabwe state-controlled community 
newspapers which run international pages carrying Xinhua stories and pictures; it also 
publishes collaborative stories with South Africa’s official Bua News Agency.16 Likewise, 
CCTV enters local networks by exchanging news programs with local media 
organizations. For instance, while CCTV is already available to many Zimbabweans who 
have free-to-air satellite receivers, in November 2011 China sealed a deal with the 
Ministry of Information for the state-run Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) and 
CCTV to share news programming. Africa Live is also broadcast on primetime slots in 
Kenyan stations. In 2010, Togolese authorities and CRI and CCTV officials agreed that 
Radio Lome and Togolese Television would broadcast China’s French-language reports 
while receiving technical and material assistance for modernizing their radio and TV 
stations.17   
    In addition to the expansion of the ‘Big Four’ media outlets, China also provides 
infrastructural and technical support to the media sector in Africa. According to Shinn 
and Eisenman, countries including Comoro Islands, the DRC, the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have all received radio 
equipment from China; the donation of computer systems to Zimbabwe’s state-run 
Herald newspaper is another case in point. Other technical support includes transmitters, 
towers, generators and antennae.18  
    The training sessions and workshops for African journalists and editors under the 
framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are another source of 
attention in Sino-Africa relations. Between 2004 and 2011 China held eight training 
                                                 
13 Yu-shan Wu, ‘The rise of China’s state-led media dynasty in Africa’, South African Institute of 
International Affairs Occasional Paper (117), (June 2012).  
14 ‘Xinhua Mobile Newspaper delivers soft-launch in Kenya’, Xinhuanet, last modified19 April, 2011,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/19/c_13836429.htm, (accessed 18 June 2012). 
15 Geoffrey York, ‘Why China is making a big play to control Africa’s media’, The Globe and Mail 
(Nairobi), (11 September 2013), available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/media-agenda-
china-buys-newsrooms-influence-in-africa/article14269323/ (accessed 2 November 2014). 
16 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, p. 205. 
17 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, p. 210. 
18 Fackson Banda, ‘China in the African Mediascape: doing better journalism’, Rhodes Journalism Review 
(29), (September 2009), pp. 52 – 53.  
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workshops for African media, sponsoring training for about 300 African media officials 
from 48 African countries in China.19 According to Zimbabwe’s Herald, in the year of 
2011 alone, 400 Zimbabwean government officers attended seminars in China, and 30 
journalists went to China for training.20  
China’s recent direct investment in South African media is considered a new phase in 
the expansion of China’s media across Africa. In August 2013, StarTimes, the fastest-
growing and most influential Digital TV operator in the region with registered branches 
in 23 countries and operation in 12 countries, purchased a 20 per cent stake in South 
African satellite television provider TopTV (renamed StarSat). StarTimes is granted the 
status of “Key Cultural Export Enterprise” and the only certified private enterprise in 
China to contract foreign projects in the radio & television industry. The inspection from 
high level party officials to StarTimes subsidiaries in Africa including Li Changchun, Liu 
Yunshan and Li Yuanchao, underscores the importance the CCP accorded the company. 
CCTV, backed up by the China-Africa Development Fund, is believed to be behind the 
Chinese consortium that provided 20 per cent of the financing for the Sekunjalo group, 
with links to the ruling African National Congress, to purchase Independent News and 
Media.21 The Independent Group, one of the most powerful media groups in the country, 
owns daily newspapers in all of the major cities.   
However, just as controversial as China’s increasing economic engagement with 
Africa has been, 22  concerns over China’s media development are many. Reporters 
without Borders, for instance, contends that China’s involvement in Africa is ‘toxic for 
democracy’.23 Critical questions are being asked about what Chinese investment in media 
may mean for editorial independence and democratic media culture in South Africa. For 
example, Prof. Anton Harber from the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, 
asked: ‘Is this just investment, or is it colonialism with Chinese characteristics? How will 
their media investments serve their interests and will this affect our media culture?’24  
A small but growing number of scholars are starting to examine the impact of China’s 
increased involvement in Africa as it pertains to the media.25 However, few studies have 
                                                 
19 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, p. 209.  
20 Herald Reporter, ‘30 Journalists leave for China’, The Herald (Zimbabwe), (28 November 2011), 
available at: http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27772:30-
journalists-leave-for-china&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131 (accessed 16 November 2012). 
21Anton Harber, ‘Chinese “soft diplomacy” enters South Africa’s media space’, Business Day Live (27 June 
2013), available at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/06/27/chinese-soft-diplomacy-enters-
south-africas-media-space (accessed 12 June 2014). 
22 See, e.g, Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa’ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement; Sanusha Naidu 
and Kweku Ampiah, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon?: Africa and China (Scottsville: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press.2008);Howard W. French, China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are 
Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014). 
23 ‘China ‘toxic for Africa freedom’, BBC News, last modified 13 February 2008,  available at: http: 
//www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7242832.stm (accessed 12 October 2013).  
24 Anton Harber, ‘Chinese “soft diplomacy” enters South Africa’s media space’. 
25 See, e.g., Xin Xin, ‘Xinhua News Agency in Africa’, Journal of African Media Studies 1(3), (1 
December 2009), pp. 363–377; Fackson Banda, ‘China in the African Mediascape: doing better journalism’; 
Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement; Xiaoling Zhang, ‘How ready is China 
for a China-style world order? China’s state media discourse under construction’, Ecquid Novi: African 
Journalism Studies 34(3), (2013), pp.79-101; Iginio Gaglardione, ‘China as a persuader: CCTV Africa’s 
first steps in the African mediasphere’, Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 34(3), (2013), pp. 15 – 34; 
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looked at the whole process of soft power involving not only China’s projection but also 
the reception in Africa. Firstly, due to the difficulties of getting to interview Chinese 
officials, there is a lack of empirical data on China’s official justifications for its 
engagement in Africa. Secondly, as Max has rightly observed, ‘the media plays a big part 
in influencing Africa’s perception of China’, 26 examinations of African media 
representations of China can shed light on how African media public view China. 
However, such examinations are only starting to emerge, and an insight into African 
editors’ and journalists’ views on China’s influence is missing. Although recent opinion 
polls by Pew Research Centre and BBC World Service tell us that China is receiving 
mostly positive views in Arica,27 their coverage of African countries is limited and does 
not tell us the broader socio-political, economic and cultural context.  
    This paper draws on public diplomacy grounded in the notion of Joseph Nye’s soft 
power,28 or, in Melissen’s words, one of soft power’s key instruments.29 This analytical 
lens allows the authors to examine the different moments of soft power - projection, 
representation, and lived-experiences. Two interrelated investigations are conducted in 
answering the following questions, thereby contributing to the construction of theoretical 
frameworks in understanding Chinese influence in Africa and offering insights into the 
effectiveness of China’s assertion in two southern African countries:   
 How does China wish to guide international views of Sino-Africa relations?  
 What are the perspectives of Chinese officials, media professionals and 
academics on Sino-Africa relations in general and media relations in particular?  
 How is China reported on major media reports in South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
 What are the editors and journalists’ views on China’s influence?  
 
First, analysis is conducted of the languages and images as projected by China Daily, 
Xinhuanet and CCTV Africa, three major official outlets for the promotion of China’s 
influence, followed by extensive interviews30with Chinese officials, media professionals 
and academics in Beijing and Nairobi. These serve not only as important foundations in 
assessing how China through its discursive official media outlets wishes to guide 
international views of Sino-Africa relations, but also to give voice to the perspectives of 
Chinese officials, media professionals and academics on the relations.  
Secondly, analysis is undertaken of major media reports on China in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, contextualized by an online questionnaire for journalists and editors in South 
Africa and in-depth interviews with journalists, officials at the Journalists Unions and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shubo Li and Helge Ronning, ‘Half-orchestrated, half freestyle: Soft power and reporting Africa in China’, 
Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 34(3), (2013), pp. 93 - 141.  
26 Rebol Max, Pragmatism and Non- Interference: Explaining China’s Soft Power in Africa. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Fudan University, 2011.  
27 ‘Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harm to America’s Image’, last 
modified 12 July, 2014, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-1-the-american-
brand/(accessed 08 April 2013).  
28 Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa, ‘The public diplomacy of al jazeera’, in New Media and the New 
Middle East, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 53 – 80. 
29 Jen Melissen, ‘The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice’, p.4, in The New Public 
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jen Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp.3 – 23. 
30 All respondents and interviewees were granted confidentiality following the ethics regulations of the 
authors’ institutions. 
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politicians in Zimbabwe. The authors are fully aware that the media in Africa are far from 
homogenous entities. So instead of identifying a consistent response to China’s presence 
in Africa, the authors follow Yun Sun who identifies two types of African countries 
which receive a higher level of attention in China’s policymaking: South Africa, a 
regional political and economic leader, and Zimbabwe which belongs to the category of 
‘problematic countries’ not only because China has large vested economic interests in the 
natural resources, but also because its volatile internal politics often raise international 
concerns and spark criticism that China is ‘propping up’ the authoritarian regime through 
economic deals and international political support.31 The questionnaire and the interviews 
serve to establish editors and journalists’ views on China, which are very likely to play 
out in their practice.  
 
China’s story  
The work on China’s perspective covers the period from 2011, when the project started, 
to May 2014.  An examination and analysis of China Daily and the online news service 
of Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet, was first conducted in March and April 2011 
respectively. 32   
    As expected, in addition to framing and legitimizing China’s involvement with Africa, 
African countries receive more positive coverage on the websites of China Daily and 
Xinhua, as is shown below.  
 
                                                 
31 Yun Sun, ‘Africa in China’s foreign policy’, Brookings, (April 2014), p.20, available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/04/10-africa-china-foreign-policy-sun (accessed 8 August 
2014). 
32 The examination and analysis of China Daily was conducted of the first 10 pages that came up with the 
search word “Africa.” A similar analysis of online news service of Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet, was 
conducted.  
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Figure 1. Tone of reports on Africa by     Figure 2. Tone of reports on Africa by Xinhuanet.com: 2011 
        China Daily website: 2011        
 
Examinations of the two official websites also reveal that negative issues tend to be 
reported positively. When talking about its involvement in Africa, China used a mixture 
of defensive and offensive rhetoric. In response to the skepticism of China’s presence in 
Africa, China employs a number of tactics to shift its image from the ‘uncertain other’ to 
the ‘friendly other’. The relationship between China and Africa was overwhelmingly 
portrayed as a mutually beneficial one and based on principles of equal partnership rather 
than a neo-colonialist attitude. Also in line with expectations, the reports tend to have no 
in-depth analysis.  
    Most noticeable from the examination is the emerging discourse from China calling on 
Africa to change the established world order which was argued to be established without 
the participation of the emerging economies. This is especially evident on Xinhuanet, 
which highlights consensus, common standing and mutual prosperity of China and Africa. 
This discourse highlights the newer, emerging rhetoric of global partnership based on 
equality. These two websites also continue to identify China as a developing country, 
aligning with African countries to challenge the West-dominated global order. 
From Xinhuanet.com
41%
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Almost one year later,33 data collected from African News and the current affairs 
program Talk Africa on CCTV Africa reveal seven significant recurring themes which are 
similar to the findings from China Daily and Xinhuanet in 2011, but with one highly 
noticeable difference, namely the absence of a clear tendency towards positive news on 
Africa. The main themes are:34   
1. Condemnation of western intervention in African affairs;  
2. Democracy, revolution, elections, crisis linked with instability;  
3. Reforming international systems;  
4. Chinese support without conditions and China’s role in Africa;   
5. China’s positive construction of the African image; 
6. Questioning USA’s behavior in Africa;  
7. Solidarity and camaraderie with Africa on the international stage.  
 
    As the figure below shows, on many days negative reporting outweighs positive 
reporting. This practice indicates the efforts of Chinese media in general but CCTV in 
particular to make the programme more attractive to both the African and international 
audiences. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Tone of reports on Africa by CCTV Africa: 24.01.2012 – 03.05.2012 
 
Interviews conducted in Beijing and Nairobi in 2011, 2012 and 2014 include six officials 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Council Information Office and the media 
industry (CRI, CCTV News, CCTV Africa, Global Times), 18 media workers from 
CCTV News including four local and two Chinese employees of CCTV Africa, Xinhua 
News Agency, China Daily and Global Times, and six media academics from Tsinghua 
University, China University of Communications and Renmin University in Beijing. 
    Interviews with officials provide a rare glimpse into some Chinese officials’ mind-sets 
on Sino-Africa relations. For instance, while he agreed that China needs resources from 
Africa, one high-level official argued, ‘China is not a threat to the West as it recovers 
                                                 
33 Data from African News: every fifth day from its first programme on 24 January 2012 to 30 April 
2012, so that the data covers three Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays, and 
Sundays respectively; from Talk Africa: 15 weeks of the weekly programme in the same period.  
34 For a fuller discussion on the themes see Zhang, ‘How ready is China for a China-style world order? 
China’s state media discourse under construction’. 
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petroleum in the least hospitable area’.35 Besides, he added, it was a mutually beneficial 
exchange. Interviews also showed that China was keen to construct a discourse that was 
different from the West. One official from the State Council Information Office reasoned 
that for a developing country such as China, it was more important to feed everybody 
than to work on human rights. ‘People of different income levels cannot share the same 
discourse’.36 He argued that China’s discourse of a harmonious world was consistent with 
UNESCO’s convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions, meaning that different discourses should co-exist. An interview with an 
official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also showed that China was more confident 
with the government-to-government approach not because it was unaware of the 
necessity to reach out to the non-government sectors but because it did not have the 
experience of doing so at home.37 On the criticism of supporting African governments to 
suppress media freedom, the official from CRI argued:  
 
Running a country is like running a household. The father may be very authoritarian. 
However, if the son has not succeeded in overthrowing the father that means the condition 
is not ready yet, whether we do business with the father or not.38 
  
    Interviews with academics showed that there was a close linkage between officials, 
academics and media professionals. This is also demonstrated by the frequent joint 
workshops hosted by media organisations, government officials, or academic institutions.  
Although interviewed scholars were critical of the government’s way of doing things in 
Africa, they did not question what was done and could sometimes be defensive of what 
China was doing in Africa. On training journalists from Africa, one academic argued: 
‘When African journalists come to China, they are here only for about two weeks, unlike 
the US who trains them with a full package’.39  The training held at the Communication 
University of China, according to one academic, introduced not only Chinese-style 
journalism, but also western theories. Besides, he added, African journalists were only 
part of the students from developing countries: ‘Why single them out?’. However, 
academics did think that Chinese media had a lot to improve before they could really 
have an influence in Africa. One complained that officials did not understand the 
alterations between domestic or international audiences, let alone the differences among 
international audiences: ‘Leaders think that outside China there is only one other 
country’.40  
Interviews with media professionals also yielded insights to the world in which they 
worked. They were well aware of the criticism coming from the West and were very 
defensive. For instance, on the issue of overwhelmingly positive reporting on Africa, one 
media researcher from Xinhua argued ‘reporting on the negative side is not doing Arica 
any favours, as very few would then want to invest in the continent.’41  The female 
Xinghua journalist just back from four years’ work in Africa cherished fond memories of 
                                                 
35 Interview, 10 August, 2011. 
36 Interview, 12 August 2011. 
37 Interview, 30 July 2011. 
38 Interview, 2 August 2011. 
39 Interview, 11 May 2014. 
40 Interview with an African Studies academic, 28 July 2011. 
41 Interview, 29 July 2011. 
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the continent, remembering the people as friendly and helpful. ‘African people are proud 
people. They are keen not to see their country always reported negatively’. 42 They 
believed that China was providing the world with a different perspective on Africa, while 
‘there are already enough reports in the world on the negative side’.43 On not providing 
in-depth reports, another media official from CCTV Africa argued ‘this practice is in line 
with China’s principle of non-interference’.44   On the credibility of state media, the 
answer from a media official was: ‘Whoever reports does not matter. What matters is that 
what has been reported is true’.45   
CCTV Africa has actively sourced local and international personnel. Interviews with 
local employees in CCTV Africa in Nairobi showed that the local employees, the 
majority of whom had worked in private media companies, brought with them different 
experiences to their new jobs. This ensures the expression of more subtle views on 
African and African related international issues.  
 
 
Balanced news reports in South Africa 
 
Zeleza sums up the various positive and negative portrayals of China in African media as 
fitting into one of three frames -- imperialism, globalization and solidarity.46   There is 
reason to suspect that reporting in South Africa’s media might follow much the same 
pattern. Building on De Beer and Schreiner’s 2009 study which pointed to the fact that 
news events pertaining to this relationship are likely to receive coverage,47 a content 
analysis was conducted of the data in the period of 2010 – 2012 generated by the research 
company Media Tenor through a computerized content analysis of all mainstream 
‘traditional’ platforms (excluding the web).48  
 
 
                                                 
42 Interview, 29 July 2011. 
43 Interview, 30 July 2011. 
44 Interview, 15 September 2012. 
45 Same interview as Footnote 37. 
46 Paul Zeleza, ‘Dancing with the dragon: Africa’s courtship with China’, The Global South 2(2), (2008), 
p.174. 
47 A. S. De Beer and W.N. Schreiner, ‘Of  “Ominous Dragons” and “Flying Geese”: South African media 
coverage of China in Africa’ (paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for Journalism 
and Mass Communication Education, Sheraton Boston, Boston, August 5, 2009). 
48 See Herman Wasserman, ‘China in South Africa: the media’s response to a developing relationship’, 
Chinese Journal of Communication 5(3), (2012), pp.336-354; Herman Wasserman, ‘South Africa and 
China as BRICS partners: Media perspectives on geopolitical shifts’, Journal of Asian and African 
Studies, (December 16 2013), doi: 10.1177/0021909613514191for a more detailed discussion of these 
data. 
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Figure 4.  Tone of SA media reports on China:2010       Figure 5. Tone of SA media reports on China: Jan. 
2011 – March 2012 
 
Figure 4 shows that the coverage of China in those outlets with the highest volume of 
reports was fairly balanced in 2010, with an almost equal balance in positive and negative 
statements on SABC 3 News, and a majority of neutral statements in Business Day. In 
2011, even after the announcement of South Africa’s accession to the BRIC group, both 
the top two outlets had a majority of neutral statements. A clear dip is however noticeble 
towards the middle of 2010, when reporting overall became quite negative before picking 
up again toward the end of 2010. An examination of the articles shows that this drop in 
positive reporting -- the only time during the two years under comparison here when 
reporting was consistently negative – was due to reporting on several natural disasters in 
China: the Yushu earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter Scale that struck in Qinghai, 
killing at least 2,000 and injuring more than 10,000; rainstorms in Southern China that 
left at least 115 dead in May; and flooding in June that killed at least 88 people and 
forced 750,000 to evacuate their homes.  
    As Figure 5 shows, the coverage from 2011 to 2012 continued to be dominated by 
‘neutral’ reports. This could be a result of the nature of broadcast news bulletins as more 
general and superficial in their approach, highlighting only new events and developments 
which may come across as more positive in tone, than the more in-depth and critical 
analyses offered by the business media, which would weigh up different positions and 
therefore be coded as neutral. Business media are also likely to report more positively on 
stories that focused on China’s economic investment in Africa, with less focus on the 
political or ideological implications. 
    A comparison with De Beer and Schreiner’s 2009 study reveals a continuation of a 
balanced picture on China. This is unlike the assumptions in the literature about China as 
being portrayed either in highly positive terms as a saviour or close partner for African 
states, or in highly negative terms as an exploitative neo-colonial predator. 
    To understand and contexualize the findings from the content analysis, a purposive 
sample of editors and senior journalists was selected based on two criteria, namely their 
employment at one of the major media outlets analyzed in the content analyses and their 
seniority in the organization which is likely to amplify their influence over media content. 
After initial contact was established via email or telephone, an online questionnaire was 
13 
 
administered to them in 2014. The 20 responses throw much light on the South African 
media professionals’ perceptions of the Sino-Africa relations and China’s influence on 
their work. It also offers insights to how the perception is translated into their daily work. 
    Responses to Question 1 on Sino-Africa relations yield no coherent perception. Those 
who show pessimism believe that the relationship is not equal, with China dictating the 
terms. The majority are not so sure, although ‘fascinated’ by what is happening. Question 
2, whether the close co-operation between the two countries will lead to good economic 
development in South Africa elicits not only varied answers but also reveal a great deal 
of concern.  Apart from the five very confident ‘yeses’ and ‘definitely’ and a couple of 
negative views on the relationship, the majority of responses are uncertain, characterized 
by ‘yes, however …’, ‘yes, but …’, and ‘yes and no’. One big worry is that the 
relationship may harm South Africa’s relationship with the West.  
    Question 3 is designed to understand their views on the political implications of the 
relationship, and once again, the answers are mixed. Perceived benefits include ‘moving 
away from the West’, and ‘potentially could form a counterweight against US/Europe in 
same political matters’. However, concerns far outnumber positive attitudes. Some 
respondents are concerned that a closer political tie would ‘impact on South Africa’s own 
internal politics or our government’s democratic principles’. Strong words such as ‘scary’, 
‘recolonizations of Arica’ and ‘fear’ are used because of ‘China’s draconian laws and 
lack of sympathy for opposing views’ and ‘more state intervention’ leading respondents 
to feel that they ‘would rather we kept our distance’. Some negative feelings derive from 
China not being transparent, ‘so we never quite know who we are dealing with’ and ‘one 
has the fear of possible corruption’. However, one respondent warns that ‘we cannot pre-
judge China’s actions until we see what is on the table’. 
The questions designed to find out about their consumption of Chinese media and their 
views on China’s increased engagement in the African cultural and media sphere receive 
many negative responses. That Chinese media is controlled and censored is one of the 
main reasons leading them to the conclusion that so far they ‘have little impact’; ‘I can’t 
see the African public consuming Chinese media’. Optimists, however, see a different 
picture because it will ‘help Africans to better understand the lives of the Chinese and 
vice-versa’. One also welcomes it as ‘a diversity of views is a positive development -- 
why always just get the view from the West?’. 
On China’s investment in South Africa’s media sector, apart from four clear negative 
attitudes, the majority are uncertain, typically starting the answer with ‘Yes if’, ‘yes as 
long as’, ‘positive if’ and ‘positive development but ….’ This shows again that many see 
it as a positive development, but they would like to see the control remains in South 
Africa’s hands and media freedom safely guarded. One response summarizes all the rest: 
‘a strange mix of positive and negative censorship and control is always a worrying 
spectre, but new voices lend diversity to the landscape’. 
When asked if closer contact with China and Chinese media will change the way they 
view their role, in spite of the differences with some very confident that it will not happen 
and some less certain, there is a shared hope that ‘South African media won’t change its 
role to adjust to China’ as Chinese media is ‘hardly a model you would want to emulate’.   
Answers are predominantly negative when asked whether the South Africa media 
provide a fair representation of China and whether they have a role to play in creating a 
better understanding of China. One given reason is that few journalists have been to 
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China and that most sources are from international media organisations. Some simply 
question where the resources would come from: ‘Unrealistic to expect South African 
media to cover China. Who will pay for it?’; ‘It is not the South African media’s 
responsibility to create a better understanding of any specific country’; ‘We’ve got far 
more important work to do than making China look better or presenting a better picture 
of it -- like telling our own stories better’.  
The last question is to find out if respondents think Chinese media have been 
successful in creating a better image. With two exceptions, the majority give a negative 
answer. Few consume the Chinese media as they are considered inaccessible, unattractive 
or difficult to understand, and not relevant: ‘And what does a Chinese TV channel and 
news agency mean to the man in a shack in Gugulethu? Probably not much’. Some prefer 
to believe that China has ‘been successful in bringing African news to China more so 
than creating a better image of China’. For one respondent, ‘Chinese soft power is much 
more influential in the gadgets it produces than in its news’. 
 
 
China’s partial success in Zimbabwe’s media sphere  
 
China’s involvement in Zimbabwe has been long and historic, given how it supported the 
anti-colonial Chimurenga struggles in the 1970s. Today, high level visits and aid 
continue under the current coalition government. In contrast to the democratic South 
Africa, Zimbabwe falls into the category of ‘problematic countries’. Widespread 
concerns have been noted on the growing official media relations, which have not only 
been hotly debated by Zimbabwean news media but also presented, defined or framed in 
ways meant to influence public opinion about China in Zimbabwe.   
    An analysis is conducted of a range of media from 2009 to 2012.  The analysis shows 
that coverage of China has been increasing from year to year. Based on the Media 
Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe in The Herald databases, the following table points to 
the number of stories in which China was covered in different Zimbabwean media outlets 
from 2009 to 2012: 
 
 Medium 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation Television  1 
(ZBCTV)  
16 62 80 132 
2 The Herald 52 74 100 102 
3 Sunday Mail 7 16 4 15 
4 NewsDay 0 4 10 2 
5 Standard 3 8 7 11 
6 The Daily News 0 0 4 6 
7 Radio Zimbabwe 33 68 78 18 
8 Spot FM 18 25 26 4 
9 Zimbabwe Independent 5 11 3 19 
 
Table 1. Number of stories on China from 2009 to 2012 
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As the figure below shows, government-controlled media -- the ZBC TV, The Herald, 
The Sunday Mail, Radio Zimbabwe and Spot FM -- allocated more space and time to the 
coverage of China. Privately-controlled media, namely Newsday, The Daily News, The 
Standard and the Zimbabwe Independent did not commit much space and time to 
covering China.  
 
Figure 6. Space and time covering China from 2009 to 2012 
 
The analysis also shows the different language used in describing China between public 
media and private media. The state-controlled media generally adopted a ‘development 
journalism’ style of reporting on China. Most of the stories were therefore positive, 
appreciating the Chinese as partners in development. China was described as 
‘Zimbabwe’s all-weather friend’ in some stories and the ‘Asian economic giant’ in others. 
A closer look at discourses in the stories pointed to an attempt to show that Beijing 
respected Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and worked in the best interest of the country’s 
development, supporting initiatives such as the land reform program, which western 
countries described as counter-productive. Where the West spoke of targeted measures 
against Zimbabwe’s political elites, China was presented to refer to these as sanctions in 
resonation with the government’s official position. China was also presented to be in 
support and recognition of Zimbabwe’s liberation war politics as opposed to some 
western countries such as Britain and the USA that were portrayed as wanting to do away 
with the liberation war movement. China was also presented as anti-imperialist and the 
Look East Policy as an alternative to western-sponsored development initiatives. Stories 
also presented cultural cooperation through, for example, the introduction of Chinese 
language in schools. This counters the discourses of a neo-colonial modernity promoted 
by the West.  
In sharp contrast, however, private media were critical of the relationship describing 
China as ‘exploitative’. Some described the Chinese as people who were long on trade 
but short on investment while others described China as ‘a dominant force in the resource 
rush’ or as slave drivers and cruel employers who demand excessive work from 
workforces without bothering to improve their working conditions and remunerations.  
Overall, the state-controlled media showed enthusiasm for the continued friendly 
relation with China while the language in private media -- akin to liberal discourses - 
called for an open, unrestrained free market system. While China was acknowledged as a 
fast growing economy, its model was portrayed to be having a missing link in terms of 
promoting civil liberties. The examination also showed that most stories in the private 
media took a slant from western news agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, AFP 
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and others that purveyed liberal discourses. Thus, the Chinese model of business was 
portrayed as feudalistic and exploitative.  
In-depth interviews carried out in 2013 and 2014 yield insights to the varying extent of 
China’s influence on different media sectors. For instance, the Union of Journalists has 
had close relationship with China since 2000. It frequently sends journalists to go to 
China on the exchange program. However, an interview with the Information Officer of 
the Union showed that while he was very positive on some aspects he was equally critical 
on others, which could be summarized in his own words: ‘There are pros and cons of 
China coming to Zimbabwe’. 49 To be specific, he thought highly of the employment 
opportunities China brought to the country, and yet he was very uncomfortable with 
China’s ‘government-to-government approach’ because China ‘does not deal with the 
civil society and therefore uses our relationship with media employers’. He was also 
critical of the ‘check-book diplomacy’, and wary of the dependency syndrome that he 
believed China was promoting. In addition, ‘China promotes a culture of consensus, 
centralization and “a one-party model”, while helping the Zimbabwe government jam 
“dissident radio stations”’. The paid trips to China, in his view, were self-serving because 
‘they are a way of whipping Zimbabwean journalists into line’ and as a result ‘ideology is 
present in media content, even in cooking programmes on television. The trips are 
resulting in partisan coverage’. He revealed that:  
 
Friendly journalists are handed trips easily and all journalists are carefully vetted… You 
cannot propose a journalist who is too critical of the Chinese. Some names are turned down. 
With the Herald they wish they can take the entire team. 
 
    He added, ‘ZBC is increasingly broadcasting boring Chinese programmes. CCTV has 
a slot on ZBC. In our news sources China is becoming more and more visible’. 
    Mr. X, a trade journalist at the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) since 
1996, was very open in his criticism of the relationship. To him, China came to Africa ‘to 
satisfy its need for resources’.50 He believed that the relationship was asymmetric, with 
China literary ‘taking over all sectors’ and ‘cutting deals that have destroyed our 
industries’. In addition, he believed that China ‘supports public media already friendly to 
them’.  
In sharp contrast, a Deputy Minister spoke highly of the journalism exchange 
programs:  
 
When journalists go to China they come back with a totally different perspective about 
China. They can see what the Chinese are doing or have done and they start to appreciate 
that in terms of development… There is nothing lucrative about the Chinese trip.  It is very 
mischievous to suggest that there is more reportage because they are getting incentives. 
 
    The anti-China view, to him, was a sponsored position driven by western interests:   
 
I think a lot of the media and Zimbabwe people have been believing Western narratives 
about China that they are here to loot the resources and their country is not a democracy; 
                                                 
49 Interview in Harare, 11 April 2013. 
50 Interview in Harare, 12 April 2014. 
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its Third World and still developing. … It is a view planted by those with an agenda to 
perpetuate western narratives about China and link with the country with corruption.  
 
    What is important to him is that ‘we work on cultural exchanges. If we watch CCTV 
then they should also watch ZBC in China’. 
    China has been purchasing equipment annually for state broadcaster/state publications 
and was greatly involved with the setting up of Star FM. Therefore the interview with the 
General Manager of ZBC only confirmed the good relationship China enjoyed with it: 
‘Broadly speaking we have seen benefits for Zimbabwe… ZBC is a good example’. 51 In 
addition to the buses from China for civil servants ZBC regularly sends technical people 
for training in China.  
 
We acquired an Outside Broadcasting van from China, a first for this country, for 
Southern Africa if not for Africa. It helps us broadcast anything from anywhere to 
anywhere in the world. We have an agreement with Xinhua. We share news and 
equipment. We share resources. We now have an up link and they can broadcast from 
here. 
 
    Another benefit from having close cooperation with China is that ‘China has helped 
put pressure on the West so that they can reengage. It has helped because now the West 
says let’s sit down and talk’. However, although ‘technically China can provide what the 
West provides’, he admits that ‘in terms of content we have not done well. Obviously 
their businesses need to be qualitatively good’. On China’s influence on their role he 
argues that ‘ZBC has been able to criticize China when necessary…. We are good friends 
but we have been able to say our friends are not doing well’. Yet he agrees: 
 
I think it has this psychological impact on you, sometimes it’s difficult… We hear stories of 
problems with labor but such stories have not come out because the media think these people are 
helping us.   
 
    Finally a group interview was also conducted with eight university students, while 
their views on China’s presence in Zimbabwe were mixed,52 they were well aware of the 
differences in the coverage of China between the state and the independent media. They 
were critical of the government media who had been too supportive.  They also thought 
of Chinese programs on ZTV ‘boring’ and therefore they did not watch them.   
 
Conclusion:  challenges and prospects 
This paper has examined the different moments of China’s soft power efforts in Africa -- 
projection, representations and reception – for an understanding of how successful China 
is in spreading its influence in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Our study has demonstrated 
that China’s state-led soft power initiatives in Africa have achieved some desired results. 
Its advantages in easy deployment of resources are obvious – the official ‘Big Four’ have 
all greatly increased their presence in Africa, which caused former U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton to suggest at a Congressional Committee Hearing in 2011 that if there is 
                                                 
51 Interview in Harare, 17 April 2013. 
52 Interview in Harare, 16 April 2013. 
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an ‘information war’ between China and the United States on an African battleground, it 
appears that China is beginning to win the war.53 
Analysis of China’s major official media discourses and interviews with Chinese 
officials show that China wants its engagement in Africa to be seen as mutually 
beneficial rather than asymmetric. It wants to increase its influence and build a good 
image in Africa as much as in other parts of the world. It aligns with African countries for 
not only economic reasons but also for Africa’s support for its domestic and foreign 
agendas. It also constructs a discourse that not only poses an alternative to the western 
one but also a challenge to the existing US-led world order. Interviews with officials 
show that China does not intend to become a rival for resources in Africa. The academics 
and media professionals interviewed are supportive of China’s increase of influence in 
Africa. They endorse the practice of providing a different perspective on Africa, so that 
rather than contributing to the stereotyping of African countries as poverty-stricken and 
war-torn, China offers more positive reporting on Africa.  
Content analysis of major Zimbabwe media demonstrates that China’s state-centred 
model and the ‘government-to-government’ approach has achieved some impressive 
results in Zimbabwe, as is demonstrated by the public media coverage of China-
Zimbabwe relations and interviews with government officials and public media 
organisations. Through different approaches China is not only enjoying a much bigger 
presence in the Zimbabwe public media, but also a much more favorable image. The 
emerging overall balanced view in three consecutive years in the range of South Africa’s 
media reports once again lead one to conclude that the media has an influence on public 
opinions as it corresponds with Pew Research Centre’s findings in 2014 that South 
Africans are ‘closely divided (45% favorable, 40% unfavorable)’. 54  It also suggests 
journalists’ and editors’ understanding that China’s role in South Africa is a complex one 
which cannot be pigeonholed as either a ‘bad’ or ‘good’ news story.    
However, analysis of private media in Zimbabwe and interviews conducted in China, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe also reveal that China has so far achieved partial success 
only. It is not surprising that the public, under the influence of both international and 
domestic media, public and private, are divided in their views about China in the two 
countries. Online responses also indicate that China is far from being able to assuage 
independent-minded editors and journalists in South Africa. It is predictable from 
responses from media professionals in South Africa that resistance will be strong if there 
is any pressure from the Chinese investors to try to shape the media sphere. Our study 
therefore points to the challenges China faces in fully convincing African publics that its 
engagement is positive.  
Joseph Nye in 2006 rightly stated: ‘[W]hether power resources produce a favorable 
outcome depends upon the context’.55 China’s non-democratic political system is the 
main cause of suspicion and even fear among South African editors and journalists as 
well as the private Zimbabwean sectors. This concern leads most South Africa 
respondents, while believing in the economic benefits and welcoming China as an 
                                                 
53 York, ‘Why China is making a big play to control Africa’s media’. 
54 ‘Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harm to America’s Image’, last 
modified 14 July, 2014, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/ 
(accessed 4 October 2015).   
55 Nye, ‘Think again: soft power’. 
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alternative to the West, to advocating caution in dealing with China. One response in 
South Africa reveals why caution is needed: ‘it may not be good for South Africa’s image 
to be seen as having too strong ties with the Communist Party of China (CPC)’.   
    Related to the above is the credibility issue of the Chinese official media working 
within the one-party political system. On the one hand they need to work out how to 
reconcile their role as loyal CPC mouthpieces and as trusted news sources. On the other 
the absence of alternative and independent media inside China itself makes it impossible 
for Chinese policymakers to draw on the expertise of the kind of media that attract 
international audiences’ attention. The lack of officials’ understanding of the different 
contexts within which soft power works explains to some extent why the state-controlled 
media are not appealing to most African media public.  
In addition, China’s ‘government-to-government’ approach proves to have largely 
failed to win media professionals’ hearts in the democratic South Africa or in the private 
media organisations in Zimbabwe. Since the Cold War, public diplomacy is taking place 
in an international environment which can no longer be described as exclusively state-
centered. This new public diplomacy extends beyond the operations of government 
altogether to the activities of the private sector and of wider society and culture. 
Interviews with Chinese officials show an increasing understanding of the need to reach 
out to civil society. However, doing so is going out of China’s comfort zone because of a 
lack of experience at home.  
Finally, Chinese state media organizations continue to face difficulties in competing 
with international media organizations such as the BBC or CNN in Africa. Interviews 
indicate that western media’s influence on the media public as well as media 
organisations is still strong. This is partly due to historical reasons, but also the ‘quality’ 
of the Chinese media that is not up to the standard of other international media 
organisations.  
Investigation needs to be done as to whether it is only wishful thinking from the 
interviewed deputy Zimbabwe minister when he stated that ‘we work on cultural 
exchange. If we watch CCTV here then they should also watch ZBC in China’. But the 
message is clear: the relationship should be reciprocal if it is to be sustainable. What also 
deserves attention is that while China is keen to align with African countries to challenge 
the West-dominated global order, both responses to the questionnaire and interviews in 
Zimbabwe show that African countries are also using China’s attention to get the West to 
reengage with the continent.  
China will be taking on a larger role in Africa, as Xi told African leaders.56 Wenping 
He of the Think Tank on Africa from the Chinese Academy of Social Science has also 
advocated ‘more soft power in Africa’.57 China therefore needs to make a more profound 
reconsideration of its overall strategic engagement with Africa to resolve the 
aforementioned problems in further expanding its influence in Africa. However, given 
the difficulties of changing the nature of the media under the current political system 
these issues will most likely remain unchanged in the near future. 
                                                 
56 ‘China set to expand influence in Africa on back of Xi Jinping's trip’. 
57 He, ‘More soft power needed in Africa’ 
